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In his essay The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,
the physicist Eugene Wigner expresses amazement over the fact that mathematical concepts
that are created with no regard for any physical application end up applying beautifully to
descriptions of physical phenomena. Wigner describes this applicability of mathematics to
physics as “a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve.” In a similar vein,
Mark Steiner considers the applicability of mathematical concepts in the discovery of physical
laws when there is physical interpretation of the mathematical concepts being applied.
This thesis formulates responses to both Wigner and Steiner. It first counters Steiner’s
claim that the success of purely mathematical analogies in discovering the laws of particle
physics implies that the universe is anthropocentric. It then formulates an explanation for
the seemingly miraculous way that pure mathematics applies to physics by giving an account
of the origin of mathematical concepts in nature, and the way in which this origin dictates
their development.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1. Background and Motivation
The earliest theories of physics concern phenomena on a human scale. This seems
perfectly natural; it should be easiest to conjecture the physical laws that describe the world
at the scale on which we live. The story of Isaac Newton being inspired to formulate his
laws of gravity after being struck by a falling apple, whether or not it is true, makes intuitive
sense. This is because we understand Newtonian gravity on an intuitive level; we jump,
we fall, we throw things and watch them arc towards the ground. However, unlike the
precise, quantitative statement F = ma, our intuitive experience of the world is subjective;
a confused mass of feelings and emotions that we react to and interpret in imprecise ways.
Apparently, however, physicists are able to codify the information that they receive from the
external world into the general mathematical statements of physical theories.
The physics of bodies that are large enough to be seen by the human eye is described
by the theory of classical mechanics, the first of today’s major branches of physics to be
formulated. As classical mechanics was nearing the end of its refinement, some thought that
physics was about to be completed. As naive as this view may seem in retrospect, it was
held by no less a figure than the French mathematician and physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace.
In 1814, Laplace said that if we could somehow know the precise location and momentum of
every particle in the universe, then we could use classical mechanics to calculate their future
values for all time perfectly (Thornton 144).
However, as the nineteenth century was coming to an end, it was becoming increas-
ingly clear that classical mechanics fails to describe the world on the atomic scale. The
next step in physics would require a unique strategy. Atomic and subatomic phenomena
were more removed from sense experience than anything that had yet been described by
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physics. The philosopher Charles Peirce did not like our chances of moving forward. He
argued that evolution could not have furnished us with the ability to understand phenomena
that plays no role in our daily life (72). How then, were the laws of the very small to be
discovered? Remarkably, it was mathematics that picked up the slack. Apparently, the role
of mathematics in physics is not only to state laws, but to aid in their discovery as well.
The critical role that mathematics has played in twentieth century physics has necessitated
a deeper understanding of the relationship between these two disciplines.
The physicist Paul Dirac, who was himself instrumental in developing atomic physics
during the twentieth century, said that physicists have two ways of making progress. The
first is experimentation and observation, and the second is “the method of mathematical rea-
soning”, which “allows one to infer results about experiments that have not been performed”
(Dirac par. 1). He expressed mystification over the success of this so-called mathematical
reasoning and concluded that nature must be mathematical in its essence. While it had
been known for a long time that physical laws are well described by mathematics (Galileo,
who lived three hundred years before Dirac, commented that the universe is written in the
language of mathematics), it is less clear what role mathematics has, or can be expected to
have, in discovering new physics. Without any physical intuition to bear on the situation,
on what basis can conjectures of the mathematical form of physical laws be made?
The first mathematical concepts were abstractions of the physical world. Arithmetic
arose from our experience of combining physical objects, and geometry from our experience
of space. It has become the practice of modern mathematicians to take the mathematical
concepts that were originally abstracted from the real world, and extend them far beyond
anything physical. We can conceive of numbers that are far larger than the number of
atoms in the observed universe, and shapes and spaces of arbitrarily high dimension that are
impossible to visualize. For the mathematician, all of this is fair game; it does not matter if
his objects have seemingly nothing to with the external world as long as they remain truly
mathematical. Just what it is that makes something mathematics, however, seems to be
determined by various criteria and preferences that have changed over time. The trend is
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towards abstraction, so mathematicians today work with theories that seem to have nothing
to do with anything at all. The goal of science is to understand the natural world, but
what is the goal of mathematics? Some mathematicians consider themselves creative artists,
working ideas into beautiful patterns. If the motivation is aesthetics, it does seem strange
that some of these concepts end up being essential in physics. But mathematics is based on
a model of the natural world, so perhaps it is expected that even its seemingly unphysical
developments would apply to nature. Is the applicability of mathematics to physics truly
surprising?
1.1. A Gift. In his 1960 essay The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the
Natural Sciences, the physicist Eugene Wigner describes the “appropriateness of the language
of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics”, as, “a wonderful gift which we
neither understand nor deserve” (par. 32). Throughout the centuries, many important
physicists have expressed a similar sense of wonder. Galileo’s contemporary Johannes Kepler
remarked:
Thus God himself was too kind to remain idle, and began to play the game of
signatures, signing his likeness into the world; therefore I chance to think that
all nature and the graceful sky are symbolized in the art of geometry. (Dyson
99)
The use of geometry as a stand in for mathematics was common at the time. In
fact, Galileo specifically said that the language of the universe is geometry. Nearly half a
millennium later, the same thought continues to be echoed. Richard Feynman:
I find it quite amazing that it is possible to predict what will happen by mathe-
matics, which is simply following rules which really have nothing to do with the
original thing. (171)
Steven Weinberg:
It is positively spooky how the physicist finds the mathematician has been there
before him or her. (Steiner 13)
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The amazement of these great scientists is due in large part to the fact that, in many
cases, mathematical concepts apply accurately to physical phenomena even when the con-
cepts were developed with no physical use in mind. These mathematical concepts, therefore,
must already exist before they are used to describe some physical phenomena. Wigner de-
fines mathematics as “the science of skillful operations with concepts and rules invented just
for this purpose” (par. 5). While elementary geometry and arithmetic were undoubtedly
suggested by the natural world, Wigner contends that more advanced concepts are not based
on anything natural or material. The only criterion for their creation is that they are “apt
subjects on which the mathematician can demonstrate his ingenuity and sense of formal
beauty” (par. 5). This is mathematics for mathematics sake, often called pure mathemat-
ics. We can define applied mathematics, on the other hand, as the use of mathematics to
solve specific questions that are external to it. While much applied work involves using
existing mathematical concepts to make models of phenomena, there are also mathematical
concepts that are created for applications. The innovative concepts of infinitesimal calculus
were jointly developed by Newton, for their application to physics, and Leibniz, for their
advancement of pure mathematics. This is an example of the way that mathematics can
blur the line between the pure and the applied.
Wigner’s consideration of the application of mathematics to physics is limited to the
use of pure mathematical concepts. His characterization of the application of mathematics
as a gift is premature because he does not properly characterize the link between the first
mathematical concepts, and the concepts that are created today. Wigner emphasizes the fact
the foundational arithmetic and geometric concepts were created to describe the external
world. They are applied concepts, which separates them from mathematics as he defines it.
But focusing on the differences between foundational mathematical concepts and the more
abstract modern concepts does not negate the fact that connections must also exist between
them. It is almost certain that mathematics could not exist at all without a perception of
nature, so there must be something natural implicit in its development. The elementary
mathematical concepts derived from nature underlie all the mathematics that has been
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created since. Steps beyond Wigner must involve a more rigorous definition of mathematics
in terms of its relationship to nature, rather than in terms of the ostensible motivations of
its practitioners.
1.2. Mark Steiner. After being motivated by Wigner’s essay, the contemporary philoso-
pher Mark Steiner wrote The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem,
wherein Steiner treats the problem of mathematics’ application to physics in a more detailed
and rigorous way than Wigner does. In addition to treating the problem of the applicabil-
ity of mathematics to physics with more depth and rigor, Steiner elucidates the following
difference between his book and Wigner’s essay:
Wigner speaks not of discovery, but of description: he asks, why is it that the
concepts of mathematics (of all things) pop up in physical laws? There are two
problems with his ‘mystery.’ First, he ignores the failures, i.e., the instances
in which scientists fail to find appropriate mathematical descriptions of natu-
ral phenomena (which outnumber the successes by far). He also ignores the
mathematical concepts that have never found an application. A deeper problem
with Wigner’s formulation is: each success of applying a mathematical idea is
just that - an individual success of a mathematical concept. The success of the
group concept, for example, might have nothing to do with the group being a
mathematical concept. (9)
Wigner’s conclusion is based on the fact that individual mathematical concepts have
worked well for describing the physical world. Steiner sees this case-by-case success as
ungeneralizable. Steiner is not claiming that something other than mathematics could be
used to describe the world scientifically, but rather that mathematical concepts must be
shown to apply to nature insofar as they are mathematical. In Wigner’s project, there is
no attempt to show that it is the mathematical nature of a concept that makes it good for
describing natural phenomena, as opposed to its physical interpretation. In the case of the
mathematical group, for example, it could be that, relative to other mathematical concepts,
groups have an especially close link to the physical world. Looking at individual cases cannot
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be shown to be anything more than coincidence, especially considering the many attempts
to describe the world using mathematics that have failed.
1.2.1. Pythagorean Analogies. To avoid Wigner’s problem, Steiner shifts his focus from
the description of physical laws to their discovery. In order to demonstrate that it is the
mathematical nature of the mathematical concepts that has made them useful for discovering
physical laws, Steiner argues that physicists have relied on a general strategy of conjecturing
new laws based on analogy to the mathematical structure or form of old laws. After noting
that a significant number of physical laws have been discovered using this strategy, Steiner
introduces the concept of a Pythagorean mathematical analogy; a mathematical analogy that
is inexpressible in anything but pure mathematics at the time that it is conceived of. The
use of such analogies in the discovery of physical laws, for Steiner, means that it must be
the mathematics that is driving these discoveries.
1.2.2. Steiner’s Conclusion. In his critique of Wigner’s argument, Steiner identifies two
problems: (1) Wigner ignores the failures of mathematical concepts to describe the physical
world, and (2) Wigner considers individual cases but does not identify a general principle
that drives them. In response to this he writes:
My own formulation avoids both problems: what has been astonishingly suc-
cessful was a grand strategy, not an isolated act, and what succeeded was the
use of the entire structure of mathematical concepts, not this or that concept.
Since this structure is defined anthropocentrically, we can now conclude both
that physicists acted as though they held (implicitly, for the most part) anthro-
pocentric beliefs, and also that the world really does look anthropocentric - in
the limited sense that it is intellectually accessible to human research. (9)
Steiner’s conclusion rests on his conception of mathematics. He sees mathematics as
“species-specific”. He goes on to say that “there is no objective criterion for a structure to be
mathematics” (6). The criteria in place exists because “mathematicians today have adopted
internal criteria to decide whether to study a structure as mathematical. Two of these are
beauty and convenience” (Steiner 7). Thus, Steiner arrives at his conclusion that the universe
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looks, “intellectually, ‘user friendly’ (in that our categories of beauty and convenience are
found in the ‘real essences’ of things) to our species, or other species like ours, if any” (8).
2. The Goals of this Thesis
I will take Steiner’s book as a jumping off point much like he did with Wigner’s essay. In
The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem, Steiner goes through many case
studies that span a broad range of discoveries in physics. In order to maintain his depth of
analysis, I will examine only two of his case studies, both of which concern twentieth century
discoveries in elementary particle physics. The first is the discovery of the quantum number
isospin by Werner Heisenberg in 1932, and the second is the discovery of the Eightfold Way
classification of strongly-interacting particles by Murray Gell-Mann in 1961. In the context
of these two case studies, I will address two main philosophical problems.
2.1. The Descriptive Applicability of Mathematics to Physics. A crucial aspect
of Steiner’s argument is the idea of the Pythagorean analogy. It is therefore crucial to un-
derstand in what sense an analogy between physical laws can have a physical interpretation.
Since physical laws are statements of mathematical concepts, the question becomes: what
should the physical world be like in order for us to expect a mathematical concept to be
physically applicable to it? Steiner’s answer is that, for a given mathematical concept, there
should be some physical application of that concept that produces quantities in a structure
that is isomorphic to the structure of the mathematical concept. The concept of multipli-
cation, for example, can be expected to be applicable to the physical world because there
clearly exists the application of tiling a floor with unit squares. The quantity of unit squares
used becomes available to us through the structural similarities between the product of two
natural numbers, and the product of the perceived lengths of the sides of a rectangle. Steiner
calls this kind of applicability mathematics’ descriptive applicability. I examine the descrip-
tive applicability of the mathematical concepts used in the case studies of isospin and the
Eightfold Way.
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2.2. The Applicability of Pure Mathematics to Physics. In shifting his focus
away from Wigner’s, Steiner does not address the essential problem put forth in The Un-
reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. What concerns Wigner is
the fact that mathematical concepts developed independently from physical considerations
can end up being amazingly apt at describing physical phenomena. Steiner points out that
Wigner’s argument (that this application is a gift) is flawed because it only considers in-
dividual instances of this applicability, but the argument can be made that “mathematical
concepts as a group, considering their origin, are appropriate in physics far beyond expecta-
tion” (Steiner 45). Steiner refers to this at the problem of “the applicability of mathematics
as such” (45). The second goal of this thesis is to make progress towards answering this
question by examining the relationship between mathematical concepts and nature, and by
determining if the natural origin of mathematics influences its development (in the modern
age) towards concepts that are adept at describing the physical world.
CHAPTER 2
Isospin and the Eightfold Way
1. Historical and Theoretical background
Steiner’s case studies draw mainly from the atomic and subatomic physics of the twen-
tieth century. The two of his case studies that this thesis will examine deal mainly with
elementary particle physics, which is the field that concerns the most fundamental particles
known to exist in nature. Given that physicists are perpetually looking to discover more
fundamental physics laws, the subject matter of this field is always under threat of redefi-
nition. Today’s fundamental particles (fermions and bosons) were not known to exist until
fairly recently, and it is likely that in the not so distant future elementary particle physics
will have to shift its focus to a new set of fundamental particles. It is therefore necessary to
give some historical background on the various stages in the development of particle physics
in order to better understand the constitution of today’s fundamental particles.
The major breakthroughs in twentieth century particle physics are marked by the
discoveries of increasingly fine layers of atomism making up the structure of matter. In the
early 1900’s, there was a growing belief that the elements could be broken down into atoms.
After a few decades, the so-called atomic theory was theoretically developed, experimentally
verified, and finally accepted by the physics community at large. The next step forward
was the discovery that the atomic nucleus is composed of protons and neutrons, which
led to the birth of nuclear physics. Together with this development came a short-lived
twinge of optimism. It seemed for a moment that the physical universe might be explainable
in terms of just three particles: the neutron, the proton, and the electron. In his The
Multiplicity of Particles, the particle physicist Robert Marshak comments, “when James
Chadwick discovered the neutron in 1932, physics had a sunlit moment during which nature
seemed to take on a beautiful simplicity ... All the multitude of substances of which the
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universe is composed could be reduced to these three basic building materials” (22). But,
as it happens, nature turned out to be hiding another degree of complexity.
The development of a new experimental tool, the high-energy particle accelerator,
allowed physicists to probe deeper into the structure of matter by smashing particles together
at unprecedentedly high energies. In the 1940’s, accelerator data began to reveal a steady
succession of what seemed to be brand new particles. A review article published in 1964 said
that “only five years ago it was possible to draw up a tidy list of 30 sub-atomic particles”,
but that since then, “another 60 or 70 sub-atomic objects have been discovered” (Pickering
50). If there had been some contentment among particle physicists, this sudden “population
explosion” obliterated it. The beautiful simplicity of the nuclear picture was replaced with a
chaotic mess of particle accelerator data. It was the job of the theorists to find some order in
all of the data, and out of those efforts came the foundation of the Standard Model of particle
physics, which classifies all known elementary particles and describes three of the four known
fundamental forces of the universe (the electromagnetic, weak, and strong interactions).
1.1. Conservation Laws. While some theorists looked at the mountain of new data
and tried to theorize in detail about the the composition and interactions of the new par-
ticles, another common strategy, and the one that Steiner is interested in, was the use of
conservation laws. The idea behind conservation laws is that some quantities must remain
the same throughout certain physical interactions. A common example from introductory
physics classes is the law of conservation of energy. It states that in an isolated system (one
that does not interact with anything outside of itself), the total energy remains constant and
is thus conserved.
In physics, there is a link between conservation laws and symmetry; each symmetry
of a physical system (feature that is preserved under a transformation) implies a law of
conservation. In order to tease out some order in the data, theorists elevated well-established
conservation laws to definitions and looked for what new symmetries emerged beyond the
known ones. Two “truly definitional conservation laws which were rooted in fundamental
beliefs about space-time” (Pickering 50) were the energy-momentum and angular momentum
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conservation laws. The former is expressed by the energy-momentum relation,
E2 = (pc)2 + (m0c
2)2
which holds for any system of total energy E2, intrinsic rest mass m0, and magnitude of mo-
mentum p, provided that the special relativity case of flat spacetime holds. Keeping in mind
Einstein’s mass-energy equivalence E = mc2, energy-momentum conservation implies limits
on particle decays in the sense that a particle cannot decay into particles with a higher com-
bined mass than the original particle. Theorists were able to use energy-momentum decay
imbalances to infer the presence of undetected particles. Angular momentum conservation
was used to make inferences in a similar way, but it also “served as the foundation for a
system of labelling elementary particles” (Pickering 51). In order to see how conservation of
angular momentum was fundamental in classifying new elementary particles, we must first
develop the concept of spin, a unique kind of particle angular momentum.
1.2. Spin. In classical physics, a rigid body admits two kinds of angular momentum:
orbital angular momentum, which corresponds to the motion of the center of mass, and spin
angular momentum, which corresponds to motion about the center of mass (Griffiths 171).
For example, the earth has orbital angular momentum from its rotation around the sun, and
spin angular momentum from its rotation about its own axis. There is no essential difference
between the two; the distinction is reflective of the fact that we are confined to perceive the
world from a fixed distance scale and thus see certain collections of matter as rigid. The
Bohr model, which is the basis for our modern understanding of the atom, models the atom
as electrons orbiting a nucleus, much like the earth orbits the sun. From this conception of
the atom is derived the electron’s orbital angular momentum. Due to the nature of quantum
mechanics, this orbital angular momentum is quantized, or, restricted to integer multiples
of the fundamental constant ~, and is given by the quantum number L.
In the 1920s, through a combination of experiments and theoretical work, physicists
decided that it made sense to ascribe a kind of spin angular momentum, appropriately called
spin, to electrons, in addition to their orbital angular momentum. In fact, each different kind
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of particle has a characteristic spin that is unchangeable by any physical process (a result
of angular momentum conservation), so spin is a useful way of classifying particles. Within
the theory of quantum mechanics, electrons cannot be regarded as actually spinning, but in
some situations, the electron acts as though it is. For instance, a classical rotating charged
ball acts like a magnet, with its north and south poles determined by its axis of rotation,
and the electrons also turns out to be a little magnet as well.
Since electrons have spin-1
2
, we will consider only the case of spin-1
2
particles from here
on out. Being as it is a quantum phenomenon, spin has several strange properties. For
instance, an electron can only be in one of two spin states upon measurement, either “spin
up” and “spin down”. This corresponds to the fact that a measurement of the spin of a
particle in a magnetic field always reveals the particle’s poles to be aligned with the poles
of the field. Furthermore, a spin-1
2
particle’s spin state is described by a vector-like object
called a spinor. A spinor differs from a vector in the following way: a 360◦ rotation of a
spin-1
2
particle will not return it to the same quantum state, but rather to the state with
the opposite “quantum phase.” The result of this is that given two electrons, one so rotated
and one left alone, the two electrons will interfere with one another, or:
for example, if we send a beam of electrons through two slits so that they hit a
screen, and install a ‘rotating’ mechanism in front of one slit so that the electrons
going through it undergo a 360 degree rotation as above, then there will be a
dark spot on the screen midway between the slits. (Steiner 86)
Because it is a kind of angular momentum, spin is a vector quantity. A planet, for example,
has a spin angular momentum of a magnitude determined by its rotational velocity and a
direction determined by the orientation of its axis in space. A spin particle has a quantized
magnitude and direction. Given by the quantum number s, spin is quantized in either integer
or half-integer multiples of ~. In addition to magnitude and direction, quantum mechanics
requires a so-called quantization of orientation. For example, consider a spin-1
2
particle, and
suppose we set out to measure the component of total angular momentum along a given axis
(called the 3-axis). This value can be at most 1
2
, if the spin is parallel to the chosen axis,
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and at least -1
2
, if the alignment is anti-parallel. Classically, any value from the continuous
range [-1
2
, 1
2
] would be fine, but in quantum mechanics, only values differing by integers are
allowed, which in this case corresponds to the discrete set, {−1
2
, 1
2
}.
For a spin-1
2
particle in three-dimensions, observable spin states are found by the spin
operators (Sx, Sy, Sz), which can be described by the Pauli spin matrices:
σx =
 0 1
1 0
 , σy =
 0 −i
i 0
 , σz =
 1 0
1 −1

The Pauli spin matrices are a representation of SU(2), which is the special unitary
group of degree 2. In general, SU(n) is defined as the Lie group of n x n unitary matrices
with determinant 1. A group representation is a way of describing a group as linear trans-
formations (matrices) on a vector space. While SU(2) itself consists of 2 x 2 matrices, the
SU(2) group representation consists of 2 x 2 matrices because the spin state of a particle is
represented by a two dimensional complex vector, where
χ+ =
 1
0

represents spin up, and
χ− =
 0
1

represents spin down. However, in general, the representations of SU(2) can be square
matrices of any dimension. Since each symmetry of a physical system implies a conservation
law, any physical system that remains invariant under SU(2) conserves spin.
2. Case studies
2.1. Isospin. Particle physicists regard the “fundamental” conservation laws associ-
ated with energy, momentum, and angular momentum as having universal scope; they are
assumed to apply in relation to all physical interactions. Beyond these fundamental conser-
vation laws, theorists were able to come up with laws that apply to some interactions and
18 2. ISOSPIN AND THE EIGHTFOLD WAY
not to others, or “restricted conservation laws” (Pickering 53). The parity quantum number
can only take on two values, p = 1 (positive parity) and p = −1 (negative parity), and has
no classical analogue. The parity of a collection of particles is determined by multiplying
the parities of all the present particles and then multiplying that by -1 for each unit of
relative angular momentum in the collection. In 1956, it was discovered that parity conser-
vation is violated in the context of the weak interaction, and thus only applies to the strong
and electromagnetic interactions. Strangeness is another quantum number with no classical
analogue that is only conserved by certain interactions. The name “strangeness” describes
particles that, “although they were copiously produced in particle interactions with typical
strong-interaction cross-sections, they decayed (relatively) slowly, having lifetimes typical
of weak decay processes” (Pickering 54). Strangeness was thought to be conserved by the
strong interaction, but, like parity, not by the weak interaction.
Isospin is a quantum number that asserts that hadrons (baryons and mesons) having
similar masses, the same spin, parity, and strangeness, but different electric charges are
identical as far as the strong interaction is concerned. For example, the strong interactions
of protons and neutrons are indistinguishable, as are those of the three different charge
states of the pion, pi−1, pi0, pi1. Each of these families, or multiplets, is assigned an isospin
number I analogous to the spin quantum number. Since isospin is a vector quantity, the
3-component (isospin projection) I3 is also quantized and used to distinguish members of
the same multiplet, much like electrons can be distinguished as either spin up or spin down.
Protons, for example have I3 =
1
2
while neutrons have I3 = −12 .
The idea of isospin came about when, in 1932, Werner Heisenberg conjectured that
protons and neutrons can be considered two states of the same particle, the “nucleon”.
Heisenberg noticed that the atomic nucleus is invariant under the action of SU(2), implying
a conserved quantity analogous to spin; that which is today called isospin. However, whereas
electron spin is understood in actual space, the “spin” in isospin takes place in a “fictitious
three-dimensional Euclidean ‘space’ (Steiner 86). Steiner writes on page 87:
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Heisenberg’s theory is that the neutron is obtained from a proton by a continuous
abstract ‘rotation of 180 degrees,’ and also that to return a neutron or a proton
to its initial isospin state, one must ‘rotate’ the particle a full 720 degrees in
the fictitious isospin space. It seems clear that the mathematics is doing all the
work in this analogy, and that Heisenberg’s analogy was highly Pythagorean.
(Indeed, even today, nobody knows why electron spin and isospin have the same
symmetry - and even if someone were to explain the coincidence, the explanation
was not available to Heisenberg in 1932.)
Thus, Heisenberg conjectured the existence of isospin based on similarities between the
mathematical descriptions of the symmetry of the nucleus, and the mathematical formulation
of spin.
2.2. The Eightfold Way. Isospin and strangeness proved to be powerful analytic tools
for making sense of the many new particles discovered in the 1950’s. As far as the strong
interaction, isospin had the added benefit of simplification, as isospin couplets made it so
that theorists had effectively fewer particles to deal with. Looking to build on the success of
these new quantities, theorists began to search for “a more comprehensive group structure -
a higher symmetry of the strong interactions with representations suitable to accommodate
particles of different isospin and strangeness” (Pickering 57). This was achieved with the
group SU(3), first proposed by Murray Gell-Mann and Yuval Ne’eman in 1961. In his history
of particle physics Constructing Quarks, Andrew Pickering describes the SU(3) classification:
According to SU(3), particles having the same spin and parity but different
isospin and strangeness can be grouped into large families or multiplets. These
families contain fixed numbers of particles - 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 27, etc. - which
are determined by the representation structure of SU(3), and which fall into
characteristic patters when plotted against strangeness and the third component
of isospin. (57)
The first such grouping that was discovered was the baryon octet. Given that it
had eight components, Gell-Mann dubbed the classificatory scheme the “Eightfold Way”
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in reference to the “Noble Eightfold Path” of Buddhism. The strategy that Gell-Mann
employed was essentially the same as that of Werner Heisenberg; he looked for a way of
classifying strongly-interacting particles that were ostensibly different into groups of particles
that were different states of the same thing. However, the SU(3) classification scheme has
some interesting idiosyncrasies. The “fixed numbers of particles” in the series (1, 3, 6, 8, 10,
27) that Pickering describes are dictated by the representations of SU(3). Gell-Mann used
this series to predict the existence of a missing member of the lower mass meson nonet, the
Ω− particle.
Another feature of the SU(3) scheme was that it grouped together particles into an
octet where the heaviest particles were 50 % heavier than the lightest particles, even though
they should have ostensibly had the same mass/energy. What turned out to be the case
was that a previously unknown natural effect was breaking the symmetry and disguising the
underlying order. Steiner concludes that “the discoverers were gripped by a strong faith in
the symmetry of the basic forces of the universe” (91). The new quantity whose symmetry
is described by SU(3) was, at the time, called unitary spin. This name choice suggests
that there is still some physically intuitive aspect to the analogy between the SU(2) isospin
symmetry and the SU(3) unitary spin symmetry, but with this latest analogy left the last
traces of of sense perception. This fact is what Steiner emphasizes as the strongest evidence
that Gell-Mann followed a Pythagorean strategy:
But most significant is this disparity between unitary spin (or SU(3)) and isospin
(or SU(2)): the group SU(2), though not isomorphic to the group O(3) of ro-
tations in three dimensions, is two-to-one homomorphic to it (which is why we
said it takes an electron two rotations to get back to its original state). SU(2) is
called by mathematicians the ‘double covering group’ of O(3). Furthermore, in
the infinitesimal limit, the homomorphism becomes an isomorphism.(This is why
we can treat electronic spin as a form of angular momentum.) Historically, the
matrices of SU(2) were used to represent physical rotations. Unitary spin sym-
metry, or SU(3), by contrast, is not isomorphic, even in the infinitesimal limit,
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to rotations in any dimension, Unitary symmetry is just an abstract symmetry -
invariance under a transformation of a three-dimensional complex space. When
we get to SU(3), the link with perception has been snapped. And this makes
the SU(3) hypothesis, the analogy to SU(2), grossly Pythagorean. (91-92)
The fact that the group SU(2) is two-to-one homeomorphic to the group O(3) (and
isomorphic to it in the infinitesimal limit) means that physicists who employ SU(2) are
ostensibly acting with less anthropocentrism than physicists who employ SU(3), which is
not isomorphic, even in the infinitesimal limit, to rotations in any dimension. Apparently,
Steiner identifies different degrees of Pythagoreanism in different analogies. Concerning
isospin symmetry he writes:
Isospin symmetry was nonspatial, but isomorphic to spin symmetry. This anal-
ogy is certainly Pythagorean - indeed, even today, physicists see no physical
analogy between the quantities ‘spin’ and ‘isospin,’ and therefore have no expla-
nation for the success of Heisenberg’s reasoning. (90)
Both isospin and spin have SU(2) symmetry, which classifies them as less Pythagorean
that unitary spin. However, the space that the SU(2) representation acts on is taken into
consideration. Since isospin is “nonspatial” spin, its discovery was Pythagorean.
2.3. Remarks. In his essay Particle Theory: From S-matrix to quarks, Murray Gell-
Mann describes a group of Japanese physicists who were unable to accept the existence of
quarks:
It was interesting to see these very intelligent theoretical physicists, working on
exactly the right problems with suitable mathematical methods, missing right
answers, missing right answers because of their fixed philosophical positions. If
I had designed a lesson in the virtues of pragmatism, I could not have found a
better one. (494)
By enumerating the various subtle ways in which group classifications of particle ac-
celerator data violate a “philosophical position”, it seems as if Steiner is liable to fall into
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the same boat as the physicists that Gell-Mann describes. In an essay called The Garden
of Live Flowers celebrating the birthday of his thesis advisor Victor Weisskopf, Gell-Mann
writes:
In most of science, the identification of pattern precedes the discovery of mecha-
nism... But in fundamental physical theory, the connection between pattern and
mechanism is unusually close. (114)
It seems as if Steiner is postulating a mechanism before identifying a pattern. The
next chapter examines his premises in order to understand his criteria for a mathematical
description to be considered physically expressible.
CHAPTER 3
The Descriptive Applicability of Mathematics to Physics
In order to properly understand Steiner’s arguments and conclusions, we must un-
derstand his answer to the question, “Can we say - in nonmathematical terms - what the
world must be like in order that valid arithmetic deductions should be effective in predicting
observations?” (Steiner 24), except instead of considering arithmetic in isolation, we must
consider any mathematical concept. The answer to this question involves a proper definition
of the applicability of mathematics to physics as Steiner understands it. Steiner submits
that the goal of his book is to contribute to the solutions of the following problems:
What it is to apply mathematics;
What it is for mathematics to be applicable;
What philosophical problems the applicability of mathematics raises;
What solutions are possible. (15)
These questions are complicated by the fact that there are multiple ways in which
mathematics can be applied. Philosophers that consider the applicability of mathematics
often concern themselves with arithmetic, while physicists like Eugene Wigner talk about
much more abstract mathematics such as complex numbers or linear operators. Physicists
see nothing puzzling about the applicability of arithmetic to the world, and may accuse
philosophers concerned with such a question of missing the point. Philosophers often return
the favor. Thus, there is a tendency for those in the two fields to talk past one another
on questions of mathematical applicability. Steiner believes that this animosity is due to
nothing more that a misunderstanding, as there is “simply no such thing as ‘the’ problem
of mathematical applicability” (Steiner 15), rather, there are different kinds of mathemat-
ical applicability. Therefore, the title The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical
Problem is misleading. In order to clear up this confusion, Steiner distinguishes between two
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kinds of mathematical applicability: semantic applicability, which is the kind usually meant
by philosophers, and descriptive applicability, which is the kind usually meant by physicists.
1. The Semantic Applicability of Mathematics
In his analysis of mathematical applicability, the contemporary philosopher Michael
Dummett looks at one way in which mathematics is commonly applied, that is, in the
following deductive sense (Dummett 256):
In the natural sciences, and in everyday life, mathematical theorems function
as premises in deductions, including those which predict observations. To apply
mathematics (in this deductive sense) is simply to use mathematical premises
to effect such deductions. Now what philosophical problems arise in applying
mathematics this way? (Steiner 16)
In order to illustrate mathematical applicability in this deductive sense, let us consider
the argument:
(1) 7 + 5 = 12,
(2) There are seven apples on the table.
(3) There are five pears on the table.
(4) No apple is a pear.
(5) Apples and pears are the only fruits on the table.
Hence,
(6) There are exactly twelve fruits on the table. (Steiner 16)
In this simple application of mathematics to an everyday problem, there is an unex-
plained semantic leap taking place. Statement (1) is a statement of “pure” mathematics,
where (7) refers to an abstract mathematical object rather than to anything in particular,
but in (2) “seven” has become a predicate characterizing the apples. A predicate in this
sense, let us call it P , is a function that takes a variable and returns true or false. For
example, if our predicate P = “in my pocket” (a physical predicate), then P (“cell phone”)
= true. So while statement (1) is purely mathematical, statement (2) is a mixture of the
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mathematical and the non-mathematical. Steiner calls the usefulness of pure mathematical
statements in “mixed” descriptions of the world like (2) and (3) the semantic applicability
of mathematics.
The philosophical problems arising from the semantic applicability of mathematics lie in
the apparent asymmetry between (in our example) ‘7’ as mathematical object and “seven”
as predicate. For Steiner, these problems were solved by the twentieth century German
logician Gottlob Frege. In order to justify the asymmetry between 7 as mathematical object
and seven as predicate, Frege claims that we must consider “apples on the table” and “pears
on the table” as instantiations of their original form. Instantiating “apples on the table”
means to posit it as a logical concept, giving it a form that is amenable to the laws of
logic. Now the predicates “seven” and “five” act on their respective instantiated concepts
and return true, or, “There are”. Note that the predicates used in the example are second-
order, as the original objects were instantiated, or raised, once. Frege believed that all
of mathematics is expressible as pure logic, so the same procedure can be done for any
mathematical statements, although their may be predicates of order higher than two. Thus,
Frege solves the semantical problem of the applicability of arithmetic, and, implicitly, the
semantic problem of the applicability of mathematics as a whole.
2. The Descriptive Applicability of Mathematics
Given that Frege solved the philosophical problems arising from semantic applicability,
The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem deals with the descriptive ap-
plicability of mathematics, which Steiner defines as “the appropriateness of (specific) math-
ematical concepts in describing and lawfully predicting physical phenomena” (25). We now
return to Steiner’s question, “Can we say - in nonmathematical terms - what the world must
be like in order that valid arithmetic deductions should be effective in predicting observa-
tions?” (Steiner 24), understood to apply not only to arithmetic but mathematics in general.
Steiner’s answer to this question will necessarily determine his analysis of mathematics’ de-
scriptive applicability.
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Although he considered mathematical applicability in a different sense, Frege still
guides Steiner in his consideration of descriptive applicability. Steiner summarizes the dif-
ference between the two kinds of applicability in the following way: “for Frege, applying
meant ‘deducing by means of’, for me it will mean ‘describing by means of’ (25). Accord-
ing to Frege, numbers give the measure of concepts, and concepts qualify objects. In this
framework, descriptive applicability considers physical objects and concepts.
Whereas Frege’s solution of the semantic applicability of mathematics was generalizable
from the case of arithmetic to all of mathematics (contingent, of course, on the fact that
mathematics is expressible as pure logic), Steiner treats descriptive applicability on a case
by case basis. He begins, like Frege, with a discussion of the descriptive applicability of
arithmetic, which he defines as “a technique for inferring the number of objects in one set
from the number of objects in another” (25). We will look specifically at addition. Define
the extension of a predicate as the set of all the objects that are accurately described by the
predicate. For instance, the extension of P = “in my pocket” is the set of all the objects
in my pocket. It so happens that the extensions of many physical predicates have certain
characteristics that make them amenable to use in arithmetic deductions. They consist of
bodies that “belong to reasonably stable families, such as are important in science and in
everyday life” (Steiner 25-26), tend not to change too rapidly in time, and stay relatively
close to one another. If the objects of a set are far from each other, we can simply bring
them close together and they will stay that way.
Thus, addition benefits from a “physical regularity”, in particular that “gathering
preserves the existence, the identity, and (what we call) the major properties, of assembled
bodies” (Steiner 27). This physical regularity is what makes addition useful in descriptive
application, but gathering cannot be called an application of adding. Steiner cites weighing
as a true application. On page 28, he writes:
If one body balances 5 unit weights, and another balances 4, then both together
will usually balance 5 + 4 = 9 unit weight. The natural numbers indirectly
describe, by laws of nature, not only the sets of unit weights placed on the scale,
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but the objects they balance. Addition of numbers becomes a metaphor for
‘adding’ another object to the scale. Arithmetic is not empirical, but it predicts
experience indirectly by the law: if m and n are the numbers of unit weights that
balance two bodies separately, then m + n units balance both. Equivalently: if
one object weighs m units, and another weighs n units, then the (mereological)
sum of both ‘weighs m + n units.’ This more usual expression looks like a
tautology, but is as empirical as the former: the expression ‘m+ n’ is embedded
in a nomological description of a phenomenon (weight). This description induces
an isomorphism between the additive structure of the natural numbers and that
of the magnitude, weight.
“Is there anything unexpected about the descriptive usefulness of addition?” (Steiner
29). According to Steiner, the answer is “no”, because “it is not hard to set down condi-
tions, in nonmathematical language, for a magnitude to have an additive structure” (29).
Presumably, the conditions for a magnitude to have an additive structure can be described
as follows: “given that magnitude(physical object 1) = m and magnitude(physical object
2) = n, magnitude(physical object 1 and physical object 2) = m + n”, where it is unclear
in what sense it is possible to express this in “nonmathematical language”. Thus, there
must exist some mechanism that induces a mapping between a physical phenomenon (for
example, placing an object on a scale and reading the given weight), and a magnitude (a
purely mathematical object, a natural number in the case of addition).
Let us consider the difference between weighing and counting as applications of addi-
tion. If we count a set of m objects and another set of n objects, then our count of the
two sets together will usually be m + n objects. The natural numbers seem to describe
the sets of “unit objects” that we have perceived, but there is no law of nature associated
with perceiving a piece of matter as a single rigid object. The difference between weighing
and counting is in the existence of the scale. The scale gives us a way to map from phys-
ical object to a magnitude that is valid in the context of the current physical theory, i.e.,
a quantity that scales with mass. Therefore, the main criterion in determining whether a
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mathematical structure can be expected to descriptively apply to the physical world, and
thus avoid Pythagoreanism, is the existence of an experiment that produces magnitudes that
are isomorphic to that mathematical structure. Furthermore, the existence of a “physical
regularity” that makes an application possible, as in the case of gathering to addition, is
irrelevant. The existence of a proper experiment implies the possibility of applying a given
mathematical structure.
3. Steiner’s Case Studies Revisited
In his attempt to “show that the cardinal discoveries of contemporary physics exploited
Pythagorean analogies by analyzing the actual strategies employed by physicists to make
those discoveries” (77), Steiner identifies several major strains of Pythagorean strategy that
were used. The discoveries of isospin and the Eightfold Way are purported to have used
strategies of the following kind:
Suppose we have successfully classified a family of ‘objects’ by a mathematical
structure S. Then we project that this structure, or some related mathematical
structure T , should classify other families of objects, even if, given present knowl-
edge, (a) S is not reducible to a physical property, and (b) the relation between
S and T is not reducible to a physical relation. We have doubly Pythagorean
analogies.
Steiner insists that the classificatory structures S and T , and their relation is “reducible
to a physical property”. This insistence is unjustified given his own account of the descriptive
applicability of mathematics. Given a mathematical structure S that successfully classifies a
family of “objects”, the only expectation that we can place upon some other family of objects
in order that S or some related mathematical structure T should classify the new family is
that there is an experiment involving the new family of objects that returns magnitudes with
a mathematical structure that is isomorphic to S or T .
This is precisely what happened in the case of the spin-isospin analogy. In Gell-Mann’s
case, practicality was the driving force, by his own admission, and he eventually discovered,
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in the data, the structure that is isomorphic to SU(3), which in turn is a related structure
to SU(2). Steiner’s sense that there must be some way of describing the relationships be-
tween mathematical structures “physically” breaks down when we consider that the only
way we can understand the objects of physical theories is through the purely mathemat-
ical descriptions “embedded in a nomological description of a phenomenon”, i.e., through
experiment.
4. Examples of the Descriptive Applicability of Space to Physics
While daydreaming in an undergraduate mathematics class, the mathematician Paul
Halmos wondered, “Are there coordinates that do not define position, just define - that is, is
there a definition of a physical object without space?” (31). This question cuts right to the
heart of the issue with Steiner’s position; the interpretation of mathematical statements in
terms of physical sensation has no bearing on the development of physics. In fact, there is a
definition of space without space, that is, descriptions of physical phenomena in mathematical
spaces that are outside of sense perception are just as valid as descriptions of physical
phenomena in terms of “coordinates that define position.”
4.1. Lagrangian dynamics and generalized coordinates. In the early 1830’s, Hamil-
ton discovered that all of mechanics could be derived from a certain dynamical principle.
Hamilton’s principle, as it is now called, says that of all the paths between two points in
space that a dynamical system can follow in a given time interval, the one that it actually
follows minimizes the time integral of the kinetic and potential energies. In mathematical
terms, Hamilton’s principle can be stated as,
min(T−U)
∫ t2
t1
(T − U)dt = minL
∫ t2
t1
L(xi, x˙i)dt
In this scheme, the function of interest becomes the Lagrangian L, which is defined as the
difference between the kinetic and potential energies of a system. Given a system, the
procedure of determining the forces and using Newton’s laws will give the same result as
determining the difference of kinetic and potential energy and plugging it in to the Lagrange
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equations.The Hamiltonian/Lagrangian reformulation of classical dynamics does not offer
any information beyond Newtonian dynamics, in terms of describing physical effects.
All that the Lagrangian requires is that a set of generalized coordinates are specified
that completely specify the state of a system. This allows the systems to be described in the
most convenient set of coordinates possible, and the choice of coordinates is something of an
art unto itself. In fact, in general there are an infinite number of generalized coordinates for
a given system. It should be noted that the Lagrange equations in generalized coordinate
were actually derived almost half a century before the statement of Hamilton’s principle. An
especially important property of the Lagrangian reformulation is that, whereas Newtonian
dynamics describes things in terms of an outside agent (force), Lagrangian dynamics only
deals with quantities within the system (potential and kinetic energy). Since energy is a
scalar quantity, the Lagrangian for a system in invariant under coordinate transformations,
including transformations involving generalized coordinates in what is called a configuration
space.
Instead of the familiar F = ma, the Lagrange equations of motion (in a conservative
force field) are
∂L
∂xi
− d
dt
∂L
∂x˙i
= 0,
where i indexes the dimensions. Assuming rectangular coordinates, kinetic energy is given
by T (x˙i) =
1
2
mx˙i
2, which is a function only of the velocity x˙i. Potential energy is given by
U(xi) = mgxi, a function of position only. Therefore it can be assumed that L is of the form
L(x˙i, xi), and the Lagrange equations can be derived by minimizing the time integral of L
using the calculus of variations.
For a plane pendulum of length l, the Lagrangian is given by
1
2
ml2θ˙2 −mgl(1− cos θ)
Plugging this in to the Lagrange equation gives
θ¨ +
g
l
sin θ = 0
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which is identical to the Newtonian result. The Lagrange equations were derived under
the assumption of rectangular coordinates, and yet using polar coordinates gave the desired
result? In this sense, Lagrangian mechanics are more general that Newtonian mechanics.
This is a large reason why they were created in the first place. It would be tedious to
describe a pendulum in rectangular coordinates, rather than the much better suited polar
coordinates.
4.2. Phase space. At a given time, the state of motion of a one-dimensional oscillator
is completely specified by two quantities, position and velocity, or (x(t), x˙(t)). These quan-
tities can be interpreted as coordinates in the phase space. A phase space plot can show how
the time evolution of a system in a mathematical space can be interpreted physically, but
be different from what is actually happening physically. Consider the example of the plane
pendulum, pictured in the figures below. The first figure plots the motion of a plane pendu-
lum in two-dimensional Euclidean space, even though the pendulum’s motion is dependent
only on θ.
Figure 1. A plot of the motion of a plane pendulum in Euclidean space. The plot
gives no “state of motion” that would allow for a precise mathematical statement
in terms of velocity or acceleration.
The plot in Euclidean space feels natural because it corresponds with actual human
observation, but this fact is meaningless in the context of physical theories. In fact, it offers
less information, in terms of the physics, than the phase space plot below. This is because
the phase space plot makes full use of each dimension; it considers two different generalized
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coordinates. The phase space plot offers a precise statement of where the system will go next
in space, but the plot in space gives us no such precision. It redundantly uses two dimensions
to represent one (θ), in order to cater to the physiology of human beings. The state of motion
given by the Euclidean plot only consists of the implicit motion of the pendulum that we
understand intuitively; more information is needed to represent the situation as completely
as the phase diagram does.
Figure 2. A phase diagram of the plane pendulum that shows all of the possible
phase paths, each corresponding to a different initial amounts of energy. The phase
path of the pendulum in stable equilibrium (E < E0) is identical to the Euclidean
space plot of a pendulum with E > E0.
Let θ be 0 when the pendulum is at its lowest point. Then let E0 be that precise
quantity of total energy which, when applied to the pendulum, causes it to swing up and
stop at θ = 180◦. Notice that the initial condition E < E0 in the phase diagram, and E > E0
in Euclidean space correspond to the same human interpretation of time evolution, namely
that the object traces out a continuous circle. This demonstrates that it is the mathematical
definitions of the concepts in our physical theories that are doing the work in analogies
between statements of physical laws.
4.3. Poincare´ sections. The plane pendulum considered before will evolve in time
simply and intuitively given some initial energy E. However, if we add a damping term
that is dependent on θˆ, and a driving torque (about the pivot point) to the system, then
its time evolution can exhibit some remarkably complex and subtle effects. For certain
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values of the damping and driving parameters, the system can become chaotic. A standard
way of describing chaos is “sensitive dependence on initial conditions”; any infinitely small
deviation in the initial conditions will lead to exponentially divergent outcomes. While this
definition (or its more rigorous version), is adequate for its use in physical theories, we have
no intuitive sense of how chaotic systems evolve in the world; their characteristics are too
subtle. A sensory experience of chaos is available to us through its representation in both
phase space and in a Poincare´ section.
Figure 3. An illustration of the way that the Poincare´ section works by repeatedly
sampling the phase plot at a constant time interval.
It sounds paradoxical, but a chaotic system is both deterministic and unpredictable. In
order to predict its time evolution, we would need to have data collection instruments with
infinite precision. A definition of a chaotic system that is equivalent to “sensitive dependence
on initial conditions” is a system that never repeats points in phase space, or an aperiodic
system. A common experimental method for detecting chaos is to watch to see if the phase
plot gets blacked out. Henri Poincare´ developed an alternate method for visualizing chaos.
His Poincare´ sections plot a point of the phase plot once every constant interval of time. As
time goes on, the Poincare´ section of a chaotic system will approach an infinitely layered
fractal pattern that is distinctive of chaos.

CHAPTER 4
The Applicability of Pure Mathematics to Physics
Chapter 3 addresses the following statement made by Steiner:
“I am not claiming, for example, that the concept of a group is anthropocentric
- on the contrary. What is anthropocentric is the concept of mathematics. My
major claim is that relying on mathematics in guessing the laws of nature is
relying on human standards of beauty and convenience” (7)
Given the premise that mathematics is human-specific, or anthropocentric, Steiner
focuses on the use of analogies to already established physical laws to conjecture new laws.
In chapter 3, it is concluded that Steiner’s distinction between expressions of physical laws
in purely mathematical terms and in physical terms is untenable because the only way
that a law of physics can be understood physically, or phenomenologically in terms of sense
experience, is through an experiment that produces data wherein the law can be verified.
Interpretations of physical laws in terms of sense experience independent of experimental
results have no validity within physics. This conclusion challenges Steiner’s claim that the
success of Pythagorean analogies in particle physics implies an anthropocentric universe.
There is, however, a larger question that has yet to be addressed, which Steiner describes as
follows:
Mathematicians, not physicists, developed the SU(3) concept, for reasons uncon-
nected to particle physics. They were attempting to classify continuous groups,
for their own sake. Because the SU(3) story is not isolated, there are physicists
who maintain that mathematical concepts as a group, considering their origin,
are appropriate in physics far beyond expectation. This is a separate question
from those we have been discussing, and, I believe, the most profound. It con-
cerns the applicability of mathematics as such, not of this or that concept. It is
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therefore an epistemological question, about the relation between Mind and the
Cosmos. It is the question raised by Eugene Wigner about the ‘unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.’ (Steiner 45)
This is the question that so mystified Eugene Wigner, namely that mathematics devel-
oped for independent (seemingly aesthetic) purposes ends up being just what is needed for
physicists to describe the world. The question of the appropriateness of such independently
developed mathematics in the description of the physical world is, as Steiner says, a much
deeper problem than that concerning the use of analogies between such mathematics in the
discovery of physical laws. Given that this is a much deeper topic than that of the previous
chapter, it would be unreasonable to expect for these problems to be neatly solved in the
next dozen or so pages. A proper treatment of the applicability of independently developed
mathematics to physics is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Instead, this chapter seeks to articulate the way in which the creation of mathematical
concepts is contingent on our experience of nature. Both Mark Steiner and Eugene Wigner,
in his essay The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences, em-
phasize the role of aesthetics in guiding the development of mathematics. While Wigner
acknowledges that the original mathematical concepts are idealizations of nature, he says
that the “more advanced concepts” in mathematics, and “in particular the concepts which
play such an important role in physics” (Wigner 2), do not seem to be suggested by the
natural world. However, since the aesthetic is so difficult to define, more progress as to
what dictates the development of mathematics can be made by looking at how concepts
that are made available to us through nature limit the possible directions of mathematical
development.
1. Foundations of Mathematics: Intuition and Logic
In order to understand the ways in which mathematics can possibly develop, it is nec-
essary to understand, to the best of our ability, what it is based in. Since mathematical
statements seem to be so certain, and perhaps even beyond doubt, mathematics is often
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looked to as a fount of absolute truth. The historical tendency in the philosophy of mathe-
matics has been towards what Imre Lakatos dubbed “foundationism” (Hersh 92), which are
philosophies that aim to give mathematics a firm foundation, and thus secure the absolute
certainty of mathematical statements.
The desire for an absolute foundation for mathematics is rooted in the sense that some
mathematicians have that mathematical truths exist independently of the human mind,
and describe a reality all their own. In this view, called Platonism, “mathematical entities
exist outside space and time, outside thought and matter, in an abstract realm independent
of any consciousness” (Hersh 9). Therefore, mathematical theorems are not created, but
rather discovered. Many contemporary mathematicians have been outspoken Platonists.
The twentieth century Hungarian mathematician Paul Ero˝s, for example, talks about “The
Book”, which “contains all the most elegant mathematical proofs, the known and especially
the unknown” (Hersh 10), which is a perfect metaphor for Platonism. The ideas of Platonism
can be traced back to Pythagoras (who lived before Plato), and is still alive in modern times.
However, Platonism is inseparable from religion; it is entirely faith-based and is usually
derived from a sense of awe that is experienced through mathematical proof. As Reuben
Hersh describes it in What Is Mathematics Really? :
Plato didn’t have a ‘philosophy of mathematics’ as we understand that phrase
today. Mathematics is central in his philosophy. His believes the physical world
of visible, changeable entities is illusion. What’s real is invisible, immaterial,
eternal. Mathematics is real because it’s immaterial and eternal. It’s tied to
religion, as a stepping stone in one’s ascent toward ‘the good,’ the loftiest aspect
of invisible reality. A challenge to his notion of mathematics would be a challenge
to his religion. (99)
While it may be the case that an absolute foundation for mathematics is unknowable,
and therefore that claims of this nature are unverifiable, foundationist philosophies of mathe-
matics often identify aspects of mathematics that are indispensable to a true understanding,
insofar as we may achieve one.
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1.1. Mathematics and Intuition. “Since intuition is an essential part of mathematics,
no adequate philosophy of mathematics can ignore intuition” (Hersh 61). An intuitionist
philosophy of mathematics seeks to base all of mathematics on a fundamental intuitive
principle. The word “intuition” in mathematics is generally veiled in ambiguity, but here it
refers to the sense in which mathematics is based on a fundamental understanding of the
physical world. In this way, intuitionism emphasizes the essential link between mathematics
and the world of experience and the senses.
1.1.1. Immanuel Kant. In his quest for the Platonic ideal of certain, a priori human
knowledge, mathematics is a central subject for Kant. He divides all a priori knowledge
into two classes. The “analytic a priori” is logical analysis, the innate ability to manipulate
ideas logically to arrive at deductions. The “synthetic a priori” are “intuitions - inherent
properties of the human mind”, which include our intuitions of space and time (Hersh 129).
These give us the foundational concepts of geometry, and arithmetic (from succession of
time) on which we use the analytic a priori to discover mathematical truth.
In order to arrive at this view, Kant first noted that “if all content that could be de-
rived from experience was withdrawn from mathematical judgments, the ideas of space and
time will remain” (Tarnas 342). From this he inferred that any sense experience is embed-
ded within a spatiotemporal framework and thus that space and time are “a priori forms
of human sensibility”, conditioning whatever is received through the senses. Mathematics
could be used to describe this world because “mathematical principles necessarily involve a
context of space and time (Tarnas 342). Physics was only scientific to the extent that it ap-
proximated the ideal mathematics of Euclidean geometry and arithmetic, which could be the
only mathematics. The extent to which we could describe the world scientifically was limited
by our mathematics, and all our mathematics could be directly understood physically. Both
mathematics and physics “contain propositions which are unanimously recognized, partly ...
by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience and yet as independent of
experience” (Kant 21).
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Kant’s idea of a perfect spatial sense means that Euclidean geometry is unavoidable.
The development of non-Euclidean geometry makes this idea indefensible, leaving unclear
what the connection is, if any between our a priori intuition of space and the mathematical
spaces that have been constructed. A final blow to Kant came with Einstein’s theory of
general relativity. Not only do non-Euclidean geometries exist mathematically, but they
describe the physical world better than Euclidean geometry does. Apparently the space that
best describes nature mathematically is not the one that is the most physically intuitive.
Rather, the task of determining the most appropriate space for physics is an empirical
question.
While Kant was clearly incorrect in claiming that Euclidean geometry is inevitable,
there is no doubt that it forms the conceptual basis for the more abstract geometries that
followed. Thus, there is a sense in which more abstract mathematics is only available to
us through our synthetic a priori capacities to understand those essential concepts that
mathematically define a physical concept like space. The preeminent logician Kurt Go˝del
writes:
Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a
perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the
axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see any reason why
we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical
intuition, than in sense perception... This, too, may represent an aspect of
objective reality. (Hersh 10)
For Go˝del, it is the most fundamental mathematical characteristics of the set that is
synthetic a priori knowledge. Perhaps it is knowledge of the nature of these fundamental
concepts that comes truthfully from intuition, rather than any specific way of classifying these
concepts (as in a system of geometry). Where Go˝del distinguishes between mathematical
perception and sense perception, Kant believes that the two are intrinsically linked. In this
aspect, his view is fundamentally flawed. Although the concepts that we understand through
the synthetic a priori come from our sense experience, they are only fundamental concepts,
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and are thus separate from our sense perception as a whole. The analytic a priori, that is,
our ability to reason logically, takes hold of the concepts that are made available by the
synthetic a priori, and manipulates them beyond our intuitive physical understanding.
In response to a potential Kantian rebuttal to his argument, Steiner writes:
Some philosophers prefer a Kantian account of mathematical discovery: the
world is the way it is, in part because of our contribution to our own experi-
ences. Mathematics is the lens through which we view the Universe, meaning
the phenomenal, or experienced, Universe (about things in themselves we know
nothing). This is also a valid attempt to explain away the data, but it will have to
come to grips with the nature of contemporary science, which deals with objects
beyond the realm of spatiotemporal experience” (9)
The statement that the Kantian will have to face the existence of “objects beyond the
realm of spatiotemporal experience” exposes a real problem with the Kantian position. Given
the success of non-Euclidean geometry, and other outlandish mathematical abstractions, in
physics, the case for physical intuition as the basis for mathematical development crumbles.
1.2. Mathematics and Logic. While Kant’s philosophy of mathematics was based
heavily on what he perceived to be our most fundamental intuitions about space and time,
and can thus be described as intuitionist, he acknowledged another fundamental capacity of
the human mind that is essential for the practice of mathematics, namely, our logical capacity.
Oftentimes in day-to-day interactions, people that are especially good at mathematics are
described as being especially good at “logical thinking”. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to
see where the mathematics begins and the logic ends. This idea is carried to its extreme in
the philosophy of mathematics called logicism, which posits that mathematics is logic, and
aims to give a basis for mathematics in logical terms.
1.2.1. Bertrand Russell. In his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Bertrand Rus-
sell writes:
Mathematics and logic, historically speaking, have been entirely distinct studies.
Mathematics has been connected with science, logic with Greek. But both have
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developed in modern time: logic has become more mathematical and mathemat-
ics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly
impossible to draw a line between the two; in fact, the two are one. They dif-
fer as boy and man: logic is the youth of mathematics and mathematics is the
manhood of logic. (194)
In his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations of Arithmetic), Frege constructed the
natural numbers out of pure logic. Given that all out classical mathematics can be built
up from the natural numbers, Russell arrived at the view that mathematics and logic are
one and the same. In his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Russell goes on to
say that “proof of their identity is, of course, a matter of detail: starting with premisses
which would be universally admitted to belong to logic, and arriving by deduction at results
which as obviously belong to mathematics” (194). He attempted to do just that in his
Principia Mathematica, a staggering three volume work written with the mathematician
Alfred North Whitehead. Though the first three volumes of Principia Mathematica did not
accomplish what Russell set out to do, he never lost faith in his quest until, in 1931, Kurt
Go˝del published his incompleteness theorems, which showed that “Any formal system strong
enough to contain arithmetic could never prove its own consistency” (Hersh 160). Go˝del’s
devastating results are usually seen as the death blow to the dream of creating a firm logical
basis for all of mathematics.
1.3. Compromise. The Kantian belief that the development of mathematics is based
on our intuitive understanding of space and time, and that geometry is therefore confined to
be Euclidean is demonstrably incorrect, yet it identifies our experience of the natural world
as an essential determinant of our mathematics. Similarly, the logicism of Frege and Russell,
and the formalism of Hilbert both failed in their quests to firmly ground mathematics, but
they identify logic as intrinsic to mathematics. Instead of postulating about the nature
of mathematics, logic, or our intuition of time and space, Ernst Mach gives a top-down
examination of the relationship between mathematical concepts, and sense experience, as
they exist now.
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1.3.1. Ernst Mach. In his Knowledge and Error, Ernst Mach gives an account of the
relationship between physiological space, the space of sense experience, and the “metrical”
or mathematical space of geometry. If this seems like a useless exercise, it may be because
it is habit to superpose mathematical space onto the world in any conscious representation,
leading Mach to claim that “the incongruity between physiological and geometrical space is
never noticed by people who do not specifically examine the matter” (258). By comparing
and contrasting the two concepts, Mach shows the way for a more satisfactory, empirical
account of the source of mathematical knowledge than Kant’s synthetic a priori, or a pure
logical foundation.
In many ways, physiological space is very different from mathematical space. We
can consider the mathematical space that Mach refers to as Euclidean space. Euclidean
space is identical everywhere (homogenous), has no preferred directions (isotropic), and
is unbounded. Visual space, in comparison, has none of these characteristics. It is non-
homogeneous on account of being finely packed with varying patterns of intensity and color.
“Up” and “down” are not only visually different, but also logically distinct given our orien-
tation on Earth. Due to the symmetry of the human body, “left” and “right’”are logically
identical but are still experienced differently. “Near” and “far” also admit different sen-
sations; “The apparent swelling of stones at the entrance to a tunnel when a train moves
in”, and “their shrinking when the train moves out” indicates that objects cannot move
through visual space without shrinking or expanding their sizes, while in Euclidean space
they are “immutable geometric objects” (Mach 251). Visual space is bounded too, although
vaguely. The physical form of the eye in the eye socket restricts our vision by a roughly eye-
shaped boundary, and the finite precision of the eye means that beyond a certain distance,
distinctions cease to be perceptible.
A sense of space is also available through the skin, which covers the surface of the body
in a complex geometry. The irregularity of the skin’s shape is one reason why the tactile
space is non-homogeneous and anisotropic. More disparity between tactile and mathematical
space comes from the fact that different parts of the skin are much more sensitive to touch
1. FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS: INTUITION AND LOGIC 43
than others. For example, the minimum distance between two adjacent points in contact
with the skin that can be distinguished is “50-60 times smaller on the tip of the tongue than
in the middle of the back” (Mach 252). Moreover the tactile space is certainly bounded by
the fineness of our skin’s sensitivity.
While touch and sight are two obvious ways of perceiving space, it is true that “every
sensation has certain spatiality” (Mach 254). The usefulness of the spatial sense varies from
sense to sense. Sight is superior when is comes to distance, and hearing, touch and balance
are good for orienting oneself in space. The sense of smell has a less robust spatial sense
because it can only discern between the right or left nostril. No sense is entirely useless
though, in certain situations where a lot of a particular kind of sensory stimulus is present,
any sense can be useful. The overall perception of physiological space is thus available
through the combination of all of the senses.
One of the few similarities that Mach identifies between physiological space and Eu-
clidean space is that both are three-dimensional manifolds because, “To every pointA,B,C,D
... of geometrical space there corresponds a point A′, B′, C ′, D′ ... of physiological space”,
and “if C lies between B and D, then C ′ lies between B′ and D′” (256). If we then assume
that “physiological space is innate” (256) as Kant did, then we do not get an adequate basis
for Euclidean space and geometry, at best we get a basis for topology.
“Why, then, is physiological space so different from geometrical space? How do we
nevertheless manage to travel from the ideas of the first to those of the second?” (256).
We arrive at our conception of Euclidean space through our experience as goal-oriented,
mobile creatures. Repetition tells us that the physiological space in which we are thrust is
not the most efficient understanding of space. We eventually acquire an understanding of
such concepts as distance and direction through our spatial sense. Contrary to what Kant
believed, the “system of spatial sensations cannot be intuited” (260). Mach asserts that “If
a man was like an immobile marine animal, unable to leave his location or greatly change
his orientation, he would hardly ever have gained the idea of Euclidean space” (258). Mach
thus identifies three factors in the development of modern geometry:
44 4. THE APPLICABILITY OF PURE MATHEMATICS TO PHYSICS
Our notions of space are rooted in our physiological constitution. Geometric con-
cepts are the product of the idealization of physical experiences of space. Systems
of geometry, finally, originate in the logical classification of the conceptual mate-
rials so gathered. All three factors have left their traces in unmistakeable modern
geometry. (299)
This provides an empirical answer to Kant’s question, “How is mathematics possible”
(Hersh 20), albeit for the case of geometry. While Kant would probably not be satisfied with
the depth of this answer, to the extent that Kant gave his answer, the question concerns the
postulation of fundamental metaphysical laws, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the
words of Reuben Hersh:
I counter Kant’s question with a counter-question: ‘Why should your question
have an answer?’ This much is clear: Mathematics is possible. It’s the old
saying, ‘What is happening can happen.’ (21)
2. Aesthetics in Mathematics
The Machian formulation of the development of modern geometry; we begin with our
notions of space which are then abstracted into the fundamental concepts of geometry and
finally classified logically to create geometries that have no physical interpretation, explains
the tendency that we have to create mathematics that seems to model sense experience. Our
primary understanding of space is rooted in intuition and physiology. The first abstraction
of these physical concepts leads to the geometry most suggested by our physiology and
evolutionary development. Mach writes that “Geometrical space is conceptually clearer, but
physiological space is nearer to sensation. That is why when we are occupied with geometry,
the properties of physiological space nevertheless often make themselves felt” (261). The
space of Euclidean geometry naturally arises first, as it maintains a link to physiological
space. It does not even make sense to talk about the properties of physiological space within
a non-Euclidean geometry.
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It should be noted that Mach’s analysis applies to all mathematical concepts at their
root, since mathematical concepts are made available to us through our sense experience of
nature. The next step for Mach is the “logical classification of the materials so gathered”
(299). The vagueness of this step leaves room for the insertion of a theory of the aesthetic
in mathematics, as Mach gives no conclusion as to what principles direct such logical classi-
fication. We can consider modern mathematics to be at the point where those concepts that
directly describe our sense experience have been studied exhaustively. Steiner writes:
Where mathematicians used to look to utility in science (after all, many of them
were also physicists), mathematicians today have adopted internal criteria to
decide whether to study a structure as mathematical. Two of these are beauty and
convenience. The beauty of a theory is a powerful reason to call it mathematical.
Yet what we call beautiful (I argue) is species-specific. (6-7)
In the era of specialization in which we live, those that “look to utility in science” to
direct their mathematics are not properly called mathematicians in the sense that Steiner
or Wigner considers them. Steiner contends that since “the computing power of our brain
is limited, ... calculational convenience becomes a reason for studying a concept” (7). He
attempts to use this fact to make the claim that it is surprising that such a “species-specific”
mathematics is useful in physics, as if our physics is not limited by calculation convenience
as well. As a species, we are situated in the universe at particular time and distance scale.
Since mathematical concepts come from our perception of nature, convenience limits the
development of both physics and mathematics in concert. As far as the criterion of beauty,
Steiner gives no attempt at a definition, referring only to the concept of beauty as species-
specific, and to the “beauty of a theory of a structure” as a “powerful reason to call it
mathematical” (7).
Wigner gives us more to work with in his description of the aesthetic in mathematics.
In his definition of mathematics, he emphasizes, in equal part, the role of mathematical
concepts in allowing for the demonstration of ingeniousness and beauty. He writes about
mathematics:
46 4. THE APPLICABILITY OF PURE MATHEMATICS TO PHYSICS
The principal point which will have to be recalled later is that the mathemati-
cian could formulate only a handful of interesting theorems without defining
concepts beyond those contained in the axioms and that the concepts outside
those contained in the axioms are defined with a view of permitting ingenious
logical operations which appeal to our aesthetic sense both as operations and
also in their results of great generality and simplicity. (par. 5)
The aspects of “logical operations” that “appeal to our aesthetic sense” are their inge-
niousness, and their ability to give results of “great generality and simplicity” (Wigner par.
5). Descriptions of aesthetic motivations are often useless as concrete support for an argu-
ment because such descriptions rarely describe an objective correspondence for an aesthetic
feeling, a feeling of beauty. From Wigner, we get the description of the aesthetic in terms of
its correspondence to “ingeniousness” and “great generality and simplicity” (par. 5). In the
remainder of this section, the English mathematician G.H. Hardy’s theory of mathematical
aesthetics is examined in order that the aesthetic feeling in the practice of mathematics can
be linked to a more solid principle.
2.1. Mathematics as Natural Science. In order to make the point that what is con-
sidered to be mathematics is based on subjective considerations of beauty, Steiner remarks
“There is no objective criterion for a structure to be mathematics - and not every structure
counts as a mathematical structure. Chess, for example, has a structure. But mathemati-
cians do not regard theorems about this specific structure as worth bothering about” (6).
In A Mathematician’s Apology, the English mathematician G.H. Hardy also considers
chess’s mathematical status. Unlike Steiner, he believes that chess is “genuine mathematics”
(16). He does not, however, fail to notice that chess is held in relatively low esteem math-
ematically. Instead of attributing the lack of interest that mathematicians show in chess
to arbitrary aesthetic standards, he explains it in terms of his own theory of mathematical
aesthetics. He writes:
in Russia, almost the whole educated population; and every chess-player can
recognize and appreciate a ‘beautiful’ game or problem. Yet a chess problem is
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simply an exercise in pure mathematics (a game not entirely, since psychology
also plays a part), and everyone who calls a problem ‘beautiful’ is applauding
mathematical beauty, even if it is a beauty of a comparatively lowly kind. Chess
problems are the hymn-tunes of mathematics. (15)
So a chess problem can be beautiful, according to Hardy, but this beauty is “of a
comparatively low kind” (15). The beauty of a chess problem is limited in some way. He goes
on to say that, “however ingenious and intricate” a chess problem may be, “however original
and surprising the moves”, it lacks an essential characteristic; “The best mathematics is
serious as well as beautiful” (Hardy 15). Thus we have identified two aspects of aesthetics for
Hardy; “ingeniousness and intricacy”, and “seriousness”. These two ideas line up nicely with
Wigner’s “ingeniousness” and “great generality and simplicity”. However, “ingeniousness”
and similar terms simply replace “beauty” with equally intractable nouns, so we can forget
about them all together. What remains is to get a better understanding of Hardy’s concept
of “seriousness”:
The ‘seriousness’ of a mathematical theorem lies, not in its practical conse-
quences, which are usually negligible, but in the significance of the mathematical
ideas which it connects. We may say, roughly, that a mathematical idea is ‘sig-
nificant’ if it can be connected, in a natural and illuminating way, with a large
complex of other mathematical ideas. Thus a serious mathematical theorem,
a theorem which connects significant ideas, is likely to lead to important ad-
vances in mathematics itself and even in other sciences. No chess problem has
ever affected the general development of scientific thought: Pythagoras, Newton,
Einstein have in their times changed its whole direction. (16)
With this statement, Hardy identifies a potential guiding principle for a sense of math-
ematical beauty, namely that beautiful mathematics is that which advances mathematics as
a science. If mathematics can considered to be a science in and of itself, than a “serious”
mathematical theorem is akin to a significant scientific discovery, as connecting “in a natural
and illuminating way” with a large complex of other scientific ideas “is likely to to lead to
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important advances” (Hardy 16) within the science itself, and more generally throughout
related fields. It is worthwhile to note that Hardy considers the both the science and the
mathematics of both Newton and Einstein as one and the same; both developed “serious
mathematics” that led to important advances in all of science. Thus, a truly serious piece of
mathematics is able to transcend the barriers between disciplines and illuminates science as
a whole. The logical classification of mathematical concepts plays the role that experiment
plays in traditional science.
Entangled in Hardy’s idea of “seriousness” is the idea of generality, which echoes
Wigner. “A serious mathematical theorem”, writes Hardy, should be “general” in the sense
that its “idea should be one which is a constituent in many mathematical constructs, which
is used in the proof of theorems of many different kinds”, and “the revelations revealed by
the proof should be such as to connect many different mathematical ideas” (24). Consider
the following examples analyzed in terms of both Mach and Hardy.
2.2. Complex Numbers. Wigner expressed a sense that mathematical beauty corre-
sponds to “great generality and simplicity”, but he does not elaborate on what exactly he
means. We can look to the example he gives as an indicator of what he considers to be
beautiful in mathematics. On complex numbers, he writes:
Certainly, nothing in our experience suggests the introduction of these quantities.
Indeed, if a mathematician is asked to justify his interest in complex numbers, he
will point, with some indignation, to the many beautiful theorems in the theory
of equations, of power series, and of analytic functions in general, which owe
their origin to the introduction of complex numbers. The mathematician is not
willing to give up his interest in these most beautiful accomplishments of his
genius. (par. 6)
He describes the value of the theory of complex numbers on the basis of its beauty.
Given that “nothing in our experience” suggests” that these quantities be introduced, he
assumes we might question their worth. But although nothing in nature suggests complex
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numbers, it is far from true that the mathematics of complex numbers is useless for describing
other things.
Instead of basing the worth of complex numbers on their beauty, let us look at how
their introduction has advanced mathematics as a science. In addition to having wide-ranging
usefulness in such mathematical fields as algebraic geometry, number theory, and analytic
combinatorics, the theory of complex functions, or complex analysis, is indispensable to
physics and applied mathematics. Steiner gives three examples of the applicability of analytic
functions to physic: the description of two-dimensional ideal fluids in hydrodynamics, the
analyticity of functions defined on a light cone in relativistic field theory, and the fact that the
critical temperature of a ferromagnet can be treated as an analytic function of the number
of dimensions of the magnet in thermodynamics. Complex functions are also indispensable
to the field of signal processing in electrical engineering.
In Machian terms, complex numbers are the logical extension of the one-dimensional
number line to the two-dimensional complex plane. This is perfectly described as a logi-
cal classification of the a mathematical concept that was abstracted from nature. Further
extended number systems exists; the quaternions are an extension of the complex numbers
that take the form a+ bi+ cj + dk, and were first described William Rowan Hamilton. The
eight-dimensional octonions further extend Hamilton’s quaternions.
2.3. SU(n). The special unitary groups of degree n, or SU(n), are the product of a
Machian classification of the mathematical concept of a group. Mathematically, a group is
as a collection of operators together with an operation that maps the collection back to itself
in a way that describes abstract symmetry (Ramond 5). Special unitary groups extend these
characteristics beyond physical intuition, and are thus adept at describing more abstract
physical phenomena.
The mathematical field of group theory, given its structural generality and its relation-
ship to physical symmetry, is known for its unificatory power within mathematics, and its
descriptive power in mathematical physics. Although the abstract group concept is most
commonly thought to have first been formalized by E´variste Galois from the development of
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the permutation group in the theory of algebraic equations, it is contended that the group
concept is equally rooted in number theory, and geometry (Wussing 16). Given the “serious-
ness” of the group concept, it is no surprise that the logical classification of groups to special
unitary groups (which are clearly connected to continuous transformations in physics), led
to breakthroughs in theoretical physics.
CHAPTER 5
Summary and Conclusions
Half of this thesis is focused on questions that arise from Mark Steiner’s The Applica-
bility of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem, and the other half looks beyond this book
to what Steiner calls “the problem of the applicability of mathematics as such” (45). In a
sense, the first half answers Steiner and the second answers Wigner. However, Wigner is
vague, and Steiner is thorough, so the specificity of the two arguments varies greatly. I felt
that I was able to make some particular points that answer Steiner quite well, whereas in
the case of “the problem of the applicability of mathematics as such”, all that I produced
was some very general thoughts and syntheses of different thinkers, but I think that there
are a few good ideas there.
1. The Descriptive Applicability of Mathematics to Physics
Steiner enumerates what he perceives to be “Pythagorean” analogies used in the dis-
coveries of particle physics. Recall that these are analogies that are characterized by the
attempted use of a mathematical structure to classify a physical phenomenon based on the
structure’s mathematical similarity to a mathematical structure that classifies a similar phe-
nomenon. If there is no sense in which the two structures have a physical similarity, then the
physicist is making the assumption that the universe cares about our mathematics, as what
we consider mathematics is human-specific. However Steiner’s insistence on mathematical
structures having a physical interpretation is unwarranted. He is biased towards physical
intuition even though it has no special place in physics. In fact, as far as anything that can
be “understood physically” is described in physics, it is described in purely mathematical
terms.
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In the specific cases of isospin and the Eightfold Way, the theorists in question; Werner
Heisenberg and Murray Gell-Mann, did nothing that required a hypocritical philosophical
stance. Heisenberg say an isomorphism between spin symmetry and a the structure of the
quantities being made available through experimental data, and Gell-Mann simply looked
to order a set of data using tools that were already at his disposal.
2. The Applicability of Pure Mathematics to Physics
By combining the ideas of Ernst Mach and G.H. Hardy, I have arrived at a tentative
theory that explains the tendency for mathematical concepts to show up in physics, even
when those concepts were developed with no physical application in mind. From Mach, we
get an account of the way that mathematical theories develop from nature. Fundamental
natural concepts are made available to us through our physical existence. They are first
understood intuitively, and they are specific to our physiology. Take the concepts of conti-
nuity and symmetry. Over time, we identify these concepts’ abstract mathematical essence.
Continuity forms the impetus for the real number line and symmetry for the mathematical
group. Through the logical classification of these two concepts, we arrive at the complex
numbers and the special unitary groups, both of which have had a wealth of unexpected
application to physics.
Mach’s idea of logical classification is thus identified with the practice of modern math-
ematics. Both Wigner and Steiner belief that an aesthetic sense drives the modern math-
ematician; he pursues what is beautiful or interesting. G.H. Hardy provides a convincing
account of the beauty of a mathematical concept in terms of its “seriousness”, which can
equivalently be stated as its scientific merit in driving mathematics, and the other sciences,
forward with the power of its ideas. This is the idea of beauty that is implicitly aimed for by
mathematicians that results in the existence of concepts like SU(3) and analytic functions
when physicists happen to need them. These concepts are not, as Wigner said, suggested
“by nothing in our experience” (par. 6). From nature they came, and to nature they return.
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